evacuation in December, 1845, namely, that we have promised to do so on the fulfilment of the terms of the Treaty of Nanking. But have these terms been fulfilled in the letter and spirit in which they were framed by the British power? Has diplomacy lost all that cannot be exercised in the intervening period assigned for the evacuation? I am ready, if required, to lay before Her Majesty's Ministers my reasons for entertaining a strong opinion that without any violation of the Treaty of Nanking, and without fraud or force, Chusan may be retained, and become, as it assuredly would, one of the most valuable and important colonies of the British Crown."
In his Minute on the British position and prospects in China Mr. MARTIN again dwells on the importance of Chusan, criticises the policy adopted in the Nanking and Supplementary Treaties, and, first among the important objects which "it appears desirable should be attained by England for the sake of China, as well as in our own interests," he places the "final cession of Chusan to the British Crown. (a) Failing this cession, the island should be placed under the protection of Great Britain, like the Ionian Islands. (b) This not being granted, Chusan to be made a free port, open to all nations with perfect freedom of residence, etc., etc."
Mr. MARTIN's views appear to have carried some weight with the Home Government, for Sir JOHN DAVIS was doubtless acting under instructions when he signed the Bocca Tigris Convention of the 4th April, 1846. There are no papers included in the Blue Books, so far as we have been able to trace, which record the circumstances attending the making of this convention, but the inference is that the Home Government were so far influenced by Mr. MARTIN's representation of the importance of Chusan that they deemed it advisable to take measures to prevent its falling into other hands, and that they accordingly sent out instructions to Sir JOHN DAVIS to negotiate a convention for that purpose.
The two first articles of this convention refer to the right of entrance into Canton (providing for a temporary delay in the execution of one of the provisions of the treaty), then comes the article in which the Emperor of China agrees never to cede Chusan to any other foreign power, followed by the one in which England agrees to protect Chusan against any invader, and the fifth and concluding article provides that Chusan is to be immediately delivered over to the Chinese authorities upon the receipt of the sign-manual of the Emperor of China to those presents.
The granting of this very modified form of "protection" was therefore made a condition upon which the island was retroceded, as the implication in the fifth article is that had China not given England the guarantee that the island should not be surrendered to any other nation, its occupation would have been continued. Such is the position of England with regard to Chusan at the present time.
The subject is not referred to in the Tientsin Treaty in any form, nor was the question imported into the negotiations that preceded the making of that treaty. Lord ELGIN's instructions when he was dispatched on his special mission in 1857 were to make the following demands: -- Reparations of injuries to British subjects, complete execution of the stipulations of the several treaties, compensation to British subjects for losses in the late disturbances, the right of the Minister to reside at Peking, and a revision of the treaties with a view to obtaining increased facilities for commerce.
Upon these demands the convention of 1846 does not in any way come into question, nor does it appear that in the negotiations between Lord ELGIN and the Chinese Plenipotentiaries the name of Chusan was once mentioned. The only connection in which it occurs is in the instructions of the British Government that the island should be again occupied should the naval and military authorities think that course desirable for the purposes of the operations they had to conduct against China.
It would therefore be absurd to suppose that the convention of 1846, which appears to have been very deliberately entered into for a well considered purpose, is rendered null and void by the words "revision and improvement of the treaties" in the preamble to the Tientsin Treaty.
With regard to the importance of Chusan we have already written at length. It was a serious mistake on the part of Great Britain ever to give it up, but it behoves the Government now to see that the consequences of that mistake are kept within as narrow limits as possible, and to recognise the responsibility cast upon it by the convention to which we have referred.
Any foreign power possessing Chusan would almost necessarily exercise the greatest sway with the Court of Peking, and seeing that the interests of England far outweigh those of all other nations, she could not safely allow any other power to acquire a preponderating influence which might be exercised prejudicially to herself.
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evacuation in December, 1845, namely, that we have promised to do so on the fulfilment of the terms of the Treaty of Nanking. But have these terms been fulfilled in the letter and spirit in which they were framed by the that power British? Has diplomacy lost all it cannot be exercised in the intervening period assigned for the evacuation? I am ready, if required, to lay before Her Ma jesty's Ministers my reasons for entertain- ing a strong opinion that without any vio- lation of the Treaty of Nanking, and without fraud or force, Chusan may be retained, and become, as it assurele would, one of the most valuable and important colonies of the British Crown." In his Minute on the British position and prospects in China Mr. MARTIN again dwells on the importance of Chusan, criticises the policy adopted in the Nanking and Supplementary Troaties, and, first among the important objects which "it appears desirable should be attained by England for the sake of China, as well as in our own interests," he places the "final ces- sion of Chasan to the British Crown. (a) Failing this cession, the island should be placed under the protection of Great Britain, like the Ionian Islands. (b) This not being granted, Chusan to be made a free port, open to all nations with perfect freedom of residence, etc., etc." Mr. MARTIN's views appear to have carried soun weight with the Home Government, for Sir JOHN Davis way doubtless acting under in- structions when be signed the Bocca Tigris Convention of the 4th April, 1846. There are no papers included in the Blue Books, so far as we bave been able to trace, which record the circumstances attending the making of this convention, but the inferences is that the Home Government were
so far influenced by Mr. MARTIN's representation of the importance of Cousan that they deemed it advisable to take measures to prevent its falling into other hands, and that they ac- (cordingly sent out instructions to Sir Joax DAVIS to negotiate a convention for that purpose. The two arst articles of this con- vention refer to the right of entrance into Canton (providing for a temporary delay in the execution of one of the provisions of the tresty), then comes the article in which the Emperor of China agrees never to cede Chusan to any other foreign power, followed by the one in which England agrees to protect Chusan against any in- vader, and the fifth and concluding article provides that Chusan is to be immediately delivered over to the Chinese authorities
upon
upon the receipt of the sign-manual of the Emperor of China to those presents. The granting of this very modified form of "protection" was therefore made a condi- tion upon which the island was retroceded, as the implication in the fifth article is that bad China not given England the guarantee that the island should not be surrendered. to any other nation, its occupation would have been continued. Such is the position of England with regard to Chusan at the pre- sent time. The subject is not referred to in tho Tientsin Treaty in any form, nor was the question imported into the negotiations that preceded the making of that treaty. Lord ELOIN's instructions when be was dispatched on his special mussion in 1857 were to make the following demands:--Reparations of in- juries to British subjects, complete execution of the stipulations of the several treaties, com- pensation to British subjects for losses in the late disturbances, the right of the Minister to reside at Peking, and a revision of the treaties with a view to obtaining increased facilities for commerce. Upon these de- mands the convention of 1846 does not in any way come into question, nor does it appear that in the negotiations between Lord Exory and the Chinese Plenipo- tentiaries the name of Chusan was once mentioned. The only connection in which it occurs is in the instructions of the British Government that the island should be again occupied should the naval and mili- tary authorities think that course desirable for the purposes of the operations they had to conduct against China. It would therefore he absurd to suppose that the convention of of 1846, which appears to have been very deliberately entered into for a well consider- ed purpose, is rendered null and void by the words "revision and improvement of the treaties in the preamble to the Tientsin, Treaty. With regard to the importance of Chusan we have already written at length. It was a serious mistake on the part of Great Britain ever to give it up, but it behoves the (Government now to see that the consequences of that mistake are kept within as narrow limits as possible, and to recognise the responsibility cast upon it by the convention to which we have referred. Any foreigu power possessing Chasan would almost ne- cessarily exercise the greatest sway with the Court of Peking, and seeing that the interests of England far outweigh those of all other nations, she could not safely allow any other power to acquire a preponderating influence which might be exercised prejudicially to herself.
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